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applies with special force when approaching a street or highway intersec-
tion, and it is the duty of a driver who is approaching such intersection to
have his car under such control as to be prepared for the traffic which he
may find there. Nor is a driver excused for nonperformance of such duty
at an intersection because his view is obscured as he approaches it.20 In
such circumstances, he is required to exercise more caution than would be
required if his view were unobstructed.21
In practically all of the cases of automobile accidents liability depends
almost entirely upon the facts of the particular case. No definite rule can
be laid down, other than the very general rules of the road which are more
in the nature of courtesy rules. The question as to a plaintiff's contrib-
utory negligence as well as a defendant's n~gligence is primarily one of
fact, depending on the circumstances and usually must be left to the jury
to determine.22 Therefore, in the instant case it was incumbent upon the
appellate court to sustain the finding of the jury since there was evidence
to support it, even though such appellate tribunal in the first instance
might have been inclined to find differently. P. C. R.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION-This was an appeal from the Industrial Board. One Krekler
had a truck which he used in hauling crushed stone for the appellants, who
were constructing ea road. His brother drove for a time; at the request of
appellants, tthe brother quit driving. Kreder then engaged another driver
who was also unsatisfactory to appellants. Krekler himself thereupon
started to drive, and did drive for two days until the accident. The truck
overturned, crushing him. Deceased was paid $1.00 per yard hauled, and
furnished the truck, the driver, and serviced the truck completely. There
was no agreement that the deceased was to haul a certain or definite amount
or for a certain time. His truck was one of several employed by the appel-
lants. He could have quit at any time or could have been discharged at
any time. Held, the deceased was an employee rather than an independent
contractor.'
An independent contractor is one exercising an independent employment
under a contract to do a certain work by his own methods and without sub-
jection to the control of his employer, except as to the production of results.2
A servant is a person employed to perform services for another in his
affairs, and who in respect to his physical movements in the performance
of the service is subject to the other's control or right to control.3
=Donsky v. Kotimaki (1925), 125 Me. 72, 130 At!. 871; Rosenau v. Peterson
(1920), 147 Minn. 95, 179 N. W. 647.
2nGosling v. Gross (1917), 66 Pa. Super. 304; Lumber Co. v. ly. Co. (1920),
115 S. C. 267, 105 S. E. 406.
2 Keltner v. Patton (1927), 159 N. E. 162 (Ind. App.) ; Stark v. Wishart (1929),
90 Ind. App. 264, 168 N. E. 711.
'Carr v. Krekler, Appellate Court of Indiana, June 24, 1932, 181 N. E. 526.
2Prest-O-Lit: v. Skeel (1914), 182 Ind. 593, 106 N. E. 365; accord, Falender v.
Blackwell (1906), 39 Ind. App. 121, 79 N. E. 393; Washburn Crosby Co. v. Cook
(1918), 70 Ind. App. 463, 120 N. E.,434; Zainey v. Rieman (1924), 81 Ind. App. 74,
142 N. E. 397; Marion Malleable Iron Works v. Baldwin (1924), 82 Ind. App. 206,
145 N. E. 559; Makeever v. Marlin (1931), 92 Ind. App. 158, 174 N. E. 517; New
Albany Forge and Iron Co. v. Cooper (1892), 131 Ind. 363, 30 N. E. 294; Crockett
v. Calvert (1856), 8 Ind. 127. Meechem, Agency, 2nd Ed., sec. 1870.
3 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, § 220 (1).
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In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an inde-
pendent contractor, there are several matters of fact that the courts con-
sider. The most important is the right of control over the means, methods
and manner of performing the work.4 If the employer retains such right,
the relationship is generally one of employer and employee (master and
servant); if the other person is permitted to choose for himself the method,
means and manner of doing the work, and is permitted to select persons to
do it, free from control of his employer in all matters connected with the
doing of the said work, that person is ordinarily an independent contractor.5
The emphasis is not on who actually did control, but who had the right to
control.6 The fact that the employer reserves the right to oversee and
inspect the work during its progress for the purpose of assuring himself
that the contract is being performed, does not put him in "control" of the
person doing the work.7 The control test for the relationship of the parties
may be overcome by the presence of other matters of fact.8
Where the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business
from that of his employer, the inference is that the person is an independent
contractor; where the person employed is engaged in the employer's regular
'Zelthlow v. Smock (1917), 65 Ind. App. 643, 117 N. E. 665; Meyer v. Ind.
Commission (1931), 347 I. 172, 179 N. E. 456. Meechem, Agency, 2nd Ed., § 1870.
6 Indiana Iron Co. v. Cray (1897), 19 Ind. App. 565, 48 N. E. 803; Zelthlow v.
Smock (1917), 65 Ind. App. 643, 117 N. E. 665; Lazarus v. Scherer (1931), 92 Ind.
App. 90, 174 N. E. 293 (to the effect that this Is a border line case, see Petzold v.
McGregor (1931), 92 Ind. App. 528, 176 N. E. 640); Makeever v. Marlin (1931), 92
Ind. App. 158, 174 N. E. 517; Schurr v. Board, etc. (1899), 22 Ind. App. 188, 63
N. E. 871; Ryan v. Curan (1878), 64 Ind. 345; The Wabash, St. Louis & D. R. Co.
v. Farver (1887), 111 Ind. 195, 12 N. D. 296; Vincennes Water Supply Co. v. White
(1890), 124 Ind. 376, 24 N. E. 747; Bedford Stone Co. v. Henigar (1918), 187 Ind.
716, 121 N. E. 277; S. 0. Co. v. Allen (1918), 121 N. E. 329 (reversed (1920), 189
Ind. 398, 126 N. E. 674). Other Indiana cases where this test was a factor In the
decision are Dehority v. Whltcomb (1895), 13 Ind. App. 558, 41 N. E. 956; Park-
hurst v. Swift (1903), 31 Ind. App. 521, 68 N. E. 620; Flander v. Blackwell (1906),
39 Ind. App. 121, 79 N. E. 393; Indiana, etc., Traction Co. v. Benadum (1908), 24
Ind. App. 121, 83 N. E. 261; Keller Constr. Co. v. Herkless (1915), 59 Ind. App. 472,
109 N. E. 797; Deep Vein Coal Co. v. Raney (1916), 62 Ind. App. 608, 112 N. E. 392;
McGee v. Stockton (1916), 62 Ind. App. 555, 113 N. E. 388; Looney v. Prest-O-Llte
Co. (1917), 65 Ind. App. 617, 117 N. E. 678; Sugar Valley Coal Co. v. Drake (1917),
66 Ind. App. 152, 117 N. E. 937; Mobley v. Rogers Co. (1918), 68 Ind. App. 308, 119
N. E. 477; Mackey v. Lafayette Loan & Trust Co. (1918), 70 Ind. App. 59, 121 N.
E. 682; Casa v. Woodruff (1919), 70 Ind. App. 93, 123 N. B. 120; Marion Malleable
Iron Co. v. Baldwin (1924), 82 Ind. App. 206, 145 N. E. 559. See also American
Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, § 220 (2).
'Sargent Paint Co. v. Petnovltsky (1919), 71 Ind. App. 353, 124 N. E. 881;
Zeitlow v. Smock (1917), 65 Ind. App. 643, 117 N. E. 665.
T Indiana Iron Co. v. Cray (1897), 19 Ind. App. 565, 48 N. E. 803; Keller v.
Herkless (1915), 59 Ind. App. 472, 109 N. E. 797; Rooker v. Lake Erie, etc., R. Co.
(1917), 66 Ind. App. 521, 114 N. E. 998; Naylor v. St. Louis Sugar Co. (1921), 75
Ind. App. 132, 130 N. E. 152; Petzold v. McGregor (1931), 92 Ind. App. 528, 176
N. E. 640; Bedford Stone Co. v. Henigar (1918), 187 Ind. 716, 121 N. E. 277; Prest-
O-Lite Ca. v. Skeel (1914), 182 Ind. 593, 106 N. E. 365; in re J. Murray (1931),
154 A 352; Litts v. Risley Lumber Co. (1918), 224 N. Y. 321, 120 N. B. 730; Van
Watermauleen v. Ind. Comm. (1931), 343 Ill. 73, 174 N. E. 846.
g Board of Comm. of Greene County v. Schertzer (1920), 73 Ind. App. 589, 127
N. E. 843; McDowell v. Dyer (1922), 78 Ind. App. 440, 133 N. E. 839, 70 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 343; Hoosier Veneer Co. v. Ingersold (1922), 78 Ind. App. 518, 134 N. E.
301; Domer v. Castator (1925), 82 Ind. App. 574, 146 N. E. 881.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
occupation or business, he is usually held to be a servant. 9 Where the
person employed receives a profit from his work, that is a factor in direct
conflict with the relationship of employer and employee.' 0 Where the occu-
pation of the employee is distinct, the employer generally has little or no
right of control over the manner and means of doing the task; thus many
cases are decided on the control test without mention of this fact of the
character of the occupation involved even when it is present."
The fact that the particular occupation is one which is usually done
under the direction of the employer in the particular locality tends to show
the relationship of employer and employee.' 9 Where the work is done by
unskilled laborers, the persons thus engaged are customarily regarded as
servants. A laborer is almost conclusively an employee in spite of the fact
that he may nominally contract to do a fixed job at a fixed price.i3 The
fact that the worker supplies his own tools is some evidence that he is not
a servant and vice versa.14 The fact that the person furnishes hiq own truck
or team and wagon, in cases where the employment is to haul for the em-
ployer, is given little or no weight in deciding the relationship of the
parties.15 This fact in conjunction with others overcame the control test
in one instance.15a Where the employer furnishes valuable tools to the
worker to be used in his work he is generally held to be a servant,16 prob-
ably because a close control can be inferred.
If the employer has the right to discharge the worker at any time, and
the worker has the right to quit at any time, the worker is generally held
9Board of Comm. of Greene County v. Schertzer (1920), 73 Ind. App. 589, 127
N. E. 843; Standard Oil Co. v. Allen (1920), 189 Ind. 398, 126 N. E. 674; Domer v.
Castator (1926), 82 Ind. App. 574, 146 N. E. 881; Makeever v. Marlin (1931), 92
Ind. App. 158, 174 N. E. 517; Lazarus v. Scherer (1931), 92 Ind. App. 90, 174 X.
E. 293.
2'Petzold v. McGregor (1931), 92 Ind. App. 528, 176 N. E. 640.
UMarion Malleable Iron Works v. Baldwin (1924), 82 Ind. App. 206, 145 N.
E. 559.1 2 
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, 5 220 (2, c).
1 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, 1 220 (2, d).
Indiana Window Glass Co. v. Mauck (1920), 75 Ind. App. 642, 128 N. E. 451; Casa
v. Woodruff (1919), 70 Ind. App. 93, 123 N. E. 120; Muncie Foundry & Machine Co.
v. Thompson (1919), 70 Ind. App. 157, 123 N. E. 196; Board of Commissioners of
Greene County v. Shertzer (1920), 73 Ind. App. 589, 127 N. E. 843; Princeton Coal
Co. v. Lawrence (1911), 175 Ind. 469, 95 N. E. 423.
S
4
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, J 220 (2, e),
Keller v. Herkless (1915), 59 Ind. App. 472, 109 N. E. 797; Mobley v. Rogers Co.
(1918), 68 Ind. App. 308, 119 N. E. 477; Marion Malleable Iron Works v. Baldwin
(1924), 82 Ind. App. 206, 145 N. E. 559; Petzold v. McGregor (1931), 42 Ind. App.
518, 176 N. E. 640; Switow v. McDougal (1916), 184 Ind. 259, 111 N. E. 3; Standard
Oil Co. v. Allen (1918), 121 N. E. 329; Marion Shoe Co. v. Eppley (1914), 181 Ind.
219, 104 N. E. 65; In re Murray (1931), 154 A 352.
"Hoosier Veneer Co. v. Ingersold (1922), 78 Ind. App. 518, 134 N. E. 301;
Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Moore (1923), 80 Ind. App. 53, 137 N. E. 887; Spichelmier
Fuel Supply Co. v. Thomas (1924), 81 Ind. App. 604, 144 N. E. 566; Grace Construc-
tion Co. v. Fowler (1926), 85- Ind. App. 265, 153 N. E. 819; Van Watermeullen v.
Ind. Comm. (1931), 343 Ill. 73, 174 N. E. 846; Frost v. Blue Ridge Timber Co.
(1928), 11 S. W. (2nd) 860. Contra Zeitlow v. Smock (1917), 65 Ind. App. 643, 117
N. E. 665; Brazton v. Mendelson (1922), 233 N. Y. 122, 135 N. E. 198.
2
5
aBd. of Comm. of Greene County v. Shertzer (1920), 73 Ind. App. 589, 127
N. B. 843.
18Indiana Iron Co. v. Cray (1897), 19 Ind. App. 565, 48 N. E. 803, American
Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, Tentative Draft 5220.
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to be an employee.17 The fact that the employer has no right to discharge
the worker at any time, and the worker cannot quit at any time, without
being subjected to liability for breach of contract, tends to show the worker
is an independent ontractor.ls
The method of payment is a factor to be considered in the determina-
tion of the relationship of the parties,19 but it is not controlling; 20 nor does
it matter how the person is compensated, if other factors show he is an in-
dependent contractor. 21 The fact that the amount of compensation is not
fixed, does not make the person an employee.22 The mere fact that the pay
is by the load, ton, yard, number of feet, or the particular piece of work,
does not necessarily indicate that the person is an independent contractor,
23
but if there is an agreement to do a stated piece of work for a fixed price,
that fact tends to show the worker is an independent contractor.24
Where the occupation in which the person is employed is one which is
ordinarily a function of the business of the employer, there is an inference
that the person is a servant. 25 When the occupation is not a function of
the business of the employer the inference is that the worker is an inde-
pendent contractor.26 The fact that the parties intend a certain relation-
ship is given weight in deciding the relationship. 27 The fact that the per-
son employed assistants to help in the prosecution of the work, while not
sufficient in itself to create the relationship of independent contractor, is
strongly indicative thereof.28
For a worker to be entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act29 he must be shown to be an employee (servant); if he is
IT Muncie Foundry and Machine Co. v. Mach (1919), 70 Ind. App. 157, 123 N. E.
196; Sargent Paint Co. v. Petrovitsky (1919), 71 Ind. App. 353, 124 N. E. 881;
Coppes Bros & Zook v. Pontius (1917), 76 Ind. App. 298, 131 N. E. 845; Grace Con-
struction Co. v. Fowler (1926), 85 Ind. App. 263, 153 N. E. 819; Lazarus v. Scherer
(1931), 92 Ind. App. 90, 174 N. E. 293; Meyer v. Ind. Comm. (1931), 347 Ill. 172,
179 N. E. 456.
Is Marion Malleable Iron Works v. Baldwin (1924), 32 Ind. App. 206, 145 N. E.
559; Slessor v. The Board of Ed. of City of Kalamazoo (1932), 256 App. Div. 127,
254 N. Y. S. 392.
IsThe Indiana Iron Co. v. Cray (1897), 19 Ind. App. 565, 48 N. E. 803; Lazarus
v. Scherer (1931), 92 Ind. App. 90, 174 N. E. 293; Re T. Murray (Maine, 1931), 154
A. 352; American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, § 220 (2, g).
"In re Duncan (1919), 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N. E. 289; Meyer v. Ind. Comm.
(1931), 347 Ill. 172, 179 N. E. 456.
= Marion Shoe Co. v. Eppley (1914), 181 Ind. 219, 104 N. E. 65.
22 Marion Malleable Iron Works v. Baldwin (1924), 82 Ind. App. 206, 145 N.
E. 559.
"8Indian Window Glass Co. v. Mauck (1920), 75 Ind. App. 642, 128 N. E. 451;
Coppes Bros. & Zook v. Pontius (1917), 76 Ind. App. 298, 131 N. E. 845.
14
Petzold v. McGregor (1931), 92 Ind. App. 528, 176 N. E. 640; Leet v. Block
(1914), 182 Ind. 271, 106 N. E. 373.
2 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Agency, § 220 (2, h).
'Mobley v. Rogers Co. (1918), 68 Ind. App. 308, 119 N. B. 477; Naylor v. Hol-
land & St. Louis Sugar Co. (1921), 75 Ind. App. 132, 130 N. E. 152; Hadly v. Rog-
ers (1921), 77 Ind. App. 203, 133 N. E. 401; Marion Malleable Iron Works v. Bald-
win (1924), 82 Ind. App. 206, 145 N. E. 559.
2T Mobley v. Rogers Co. (1918), 68 Ind. App. 308, 119 N. E. 477; Coppes Bros. &
Zook v. Pontius (1921), 76 Ind. App. 298, 131 N. B. 845.
= Switow v. McDougal (1916), 184 Ind. 259, 111 N. E. 3; Domer v. Castator
(1925), 82 Ind. App. 574, 146 N. U. 881; Lazarus v. Scherer (1931), 92 Ind. App. 90,
174 N. B. 293; Lichtenager v. Silverman (1931), 254 N. Y. S. 392.
"Acts of 1929, c, 172; 1929 Burns Sup. see. 9447.
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shown to be an independent contractor he is denied compensation.S0 The
liability under the workmen's compensation acts is not based upon fault
on the part of the employer, but upon the theory that the burden of indus-
trial injuries should be placed upon the industry in which they occur. 1
As a rationalization of the liability without fault placed upon the employer,
some courts have said that the liability to pay for injuries to an employee
is implied in every contract of employment.32 The courts of Indiana and
the majority of the other states are liberal in finding a worker an "em-
ployee." 3 3 If there is doubt as to the relationship the worker is held to be
an "employee."
3 4 The view has been expressed that the law of independent
contractor should be eliminated in proceedings under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts since it grew up in a law that is foreign to the theory of
liability under the acts.3 5 It is submitted, however, that the legislature
may have intended to limit recovery under the acts to a particular class,
namely that class called "employees" as distinguished from "independent
contractors," as these terms were used at the time of the passage of the
Act. The same problem arose under the Dangerous Occupation Act and
the Employer's Liability Acts which preceded the Workmen's Compensation
Act, where the term "employee" was used to describe the class of persons
that came within the Acts. Thus it would seem that the legislature would
have enlarged-the class protected by eliminating the independent contractor
defense if it had wished to.
It is submitted that in cases where the relationship of master and ser-
vant is a necessary element in determining the vicarious liability of the
employer for the negligent act of a worker, the courts are more strict in
finding the worker an employee than in workmen's compensation cases.
3
6
Hauling cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act in Indiana and
other jurisdictions, with similar facts are generally in accord with the prin-
cipal case.3 7 When the special policy behind the theory of liability under
"0 Columbia School Supply Co. v. Lewis (1917), 63 Ind. App. 386, 115 N. E. 103;
Coppes Bros. & Zook v. Pontius (1917), 76 Ind. App. 298, 131 N. E. 845; Zainey v.
Rieman (1924), 81 Ind. App. 74, 142 N. E. 397; Standard Oil Co. v. Allen (1920),
189 Ind. 398, 126 N. E. 674.
"In re Duncan (1919), 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N. E. 289; Crawfordsville Shale
Brick Co. v. Starburk (1924), 80 Ind. App. 649, 141 N. E. 7; Imperial Brass Mfg.
Co. v. Ind. Comm. (1922), 306 Ill. 11, 137 N. E. 411, 26 A. L. R. 161.
"Kennedy v. Cunard (1921), 189 N. Y. S. 402.
uChicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Haufman (1921), 78 Ind. App. 474, 133 N. E. 399.
But see Standard Oil Co. v. Allen (1918), 121 N. E. 329, 123 N. E. 329, 126 N. E.
674.
sIn re Duncan (1919), 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N. E. 289; McDowell v. Duer
(1922), 78 Ind. App. 440, 133 N. E. 839; Hurst Rec. v. Hunley (1924), 81 Ind. App.
203, 141 N. E. 557; Dowery v. State (1925), 84 Ind. App. 37, 149 N. E. 922; Feey v.
Bobrink (1926), 84 Ind. App. 559, 151 N. E. 705.
"Brandeis, T., dissent, in Crowell v. Benson (1932), 52 Sup. Ct. 305.
"B ooker v. Lake Erie etc. R. B. Co. (1917), 66 Ind. App. 521, 114 N. E. 998;
Washburn v. Crosby Co. (1918), 70 Ind. App. 463, 120 N. E. 434; Sargent Paint Co.
v. Petrovitzky (1919), 71 Ind. App. 353, 124 N. E. 881; Scott Construction Co. v.
Cobb (1927), 86 Ind. App. 699, 159 N. E. 763; Crockett v. Calvert (1856), 8 Ind.
127; Ohio & Miss. R. R. Co. v. Davis (1864), 23 Ind. 553; Ryan v. Curan (1878),
64 Ind. 345; The Wabash & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Farver (1887), 111 Ind. 195,
12 N. E. 296; Falender v. Blackwell (1906), 39 Ind. App. 121, 79 N. E. 393; Brax-
ton v. Mendelson (1922), 233 N. Y. 122, 138 N. E. 198.
vrSugar Valley Coal Co. v. Drake (1917), 66 Ind. App. 152, 117 N. E. 937;
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the Workmen's Compensation Act, the factors going to show the relation-
ship, and the weight given to each factor are considered, the case seems
rightly decided. R. S. M.
PLEADING-APPEAL AND ERRoR-REvEnsAL BECAUSE OF ERRONEOUS
OVERRULING OF DEMURRER-Plaintiff sued for breach of a 'written contract.
Plaintiff was appointed superintendent of city schools in Crawfordsville
for a period of three years. He alleged that defendant discharged him "in
violation of contract and without good cause." Defendant demurred to
the complaint on the ground of insufficient facts because the complaint
did not show that plaintiff was discharged by action of the board in which
the board acted in bad faith, corruptly, fraudulently, or that the board had
grossly abused its discretion. Demurrer was overruled and defendant filed
a general denial. The case was tried and judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff. Defendant appealed assigning as errors, first, that the trial court
erred in overruling the demurrer to the complaint; and second, that the
trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a new trial. Held,
demurrer to the complaint should have been sustained and the judgment is
therefore reversed.1
It is obvious that the court in the principal case reversed the decision
of the trial court solely because of the erroneous overruling of the de-
murrer. The court said, "Our ruling as to the demurrer makes it unneces-
sary to consider the other questions presented by this appeal." The other
important question presented by the appeal, as stated-in the facts, was
whether the lower court wrongfully overruled the defendant's motion for a
new trial. The appellate court absolutely refused to consider the merits of
the controversy when it refused to consider the ruling of the lower court
on the defendant's motion for a new trial; and therefore the reversal was
had merely because of an erroneous ruling on the demurrer. This action
of the court is in violation of the statutes covering this situation. Section
725 Burns 1926 provides that "no judgment shall be stayed or reversed, in
whole or in part, for any defect in form, variance, or imperfection con-
tained in the record, pleadings, process, entry, returns, or other proceedings
therein which by law might be amended by the court below, but such de-
fects shall be deemed to be amended in the Supreme Court; nor shall any
judgment be stayed, or reversed, in whole or in part, where it shall appear
to the court that the merits of the cause have been fairly tried and deter-
mined in the court below." Section 426 Burns 1926 provides that "the
court must in every stage of the action disregard any error or defect in the
pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial right of the
Washburn Crosby Co. v. Cook (1918), 70 Ind. App. 463, 120 N. E. 434; Nissen
Transfer Co. v. Miller (1920), 72 Ind. App. 261, 125 N. E. 652; Coppes Bros. &
Zook v. Pontius (1917), 76 Ind. App. 298, 131 N. E. 845; McDowell v. Duer (1922),
78 Ind. App. 440, 133 N. E. 839; Hossier Veneer Co. v. Ingersol (1922), 78 Ind.
App. 618, 134 N. E. 301; Latshaw v. McCarter (1922), 79 Ind. App. 623, 137 N. M.
565; Spichelmeier Fuel & Supply Co. v. Thomas (1924), 81 Ind. App. 604, 144 N. E.
566; Crockett v. Calvert (1826), 8 Ind. 127; Zeitlow v. Smock (1917), 65 Ind. App.
643, 117 N. E. 665; Braxton v. Mendelson (1922), 233 N. Y. 122, 135 N. E. 198;
Louchrian v. Autophone Co. (1902), 78 N. Y. S. 919; Kavanaugh v. Belden (1931),
247 N. Y. S. 714; Constello's Case (1919), 232 Mass. 456, 122 N. E. 560.
'School City of Crawfordsvlle v. Montgomery, Supreme Court of Indiana, 1933,
187 N. r. 57.
